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ABSTRACT 
In reality, subnational governments suffer from moral hazard, creating uncertainty which, 
in turn, causes economic inefficiency. The behavior of subnational governments cannot 
be observed by the central government. An analysis which takes into account this 
phenomenon is therefore needed. Decentralization implies delegating authority from 
central government to subnational governments. In this study, the subnational 
government is represented by the local government. This study utilizes a model of 
principal-agent. The central government acts as a principal who delegates fiscal authority 
to subnational governments who act as agents. By applying principal-agent model, we can 
use the primal-dual approach to analyze both revenue and expenditure assignment 
associated with the tax effort of the subnational governments. The result from artificial 
neural network approach shows that asymmetric information between central and 
subnational governments exists in Indonesia. 
 
Keywords: Artificial Neural Network, Fiscal Decentralization, Local Tax Effort, Primal-
Dual, Principal-Agent. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Pada kenyataannya, pemerintah daerah mengalami moral hazard, menciptakan 
ketidakpastian yang pada gilirannya menyebabkan inefisiensi ekonomi. Perilaku 
pemerintah daerah tidak dapat diamati oleh pemerintah pusat. Oleh karena itu, 
diperlukan analisis yang memperhitungkan fenomena ini. Desentralisasi menyiratkan 
pendelegasian wewenang dari pemerintah pusat ke pemerintah daerah. Dalam studi ini, 
pemerintah daerah diwakili oleh pemerintah daerah. Penelitian ini menggunakan model 
principal-agent. Pemerintah pusat bertindak sebagai kepala yang mendelegasikan 
kewenangan fiskal kepada pemerintah daerah yang bertindak sebagai agen. Dengan 
menerapkan model principal-agent, kita dapat menggunakan pendekatan primal-dual 
untuk menganalisis baik tugas pendapatan dan pengeluaran terkait dengan upaya pajak 
dari pemerintah daerah. Hasil dari pendekatan artificial neural network menunjukkan 
bahwa informasi asimetris antara pemerintah pusat dan daerah ada di Indonesia. 
 
Kata Kunci: Artificial Neural Network, Desentralisasi Fiskal, Upaya Pajak Daerah, Primal-
Dual, Principal-Agent. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of the government is the redistribution of income, the provision of public goods and social 
protection (Gramlich, 1990). Governments perform these functions for all citizens. When the area and 
population is too large, it is difficult for government in carrying out these functions, and then the multi-
level system of government is indispensable. Multi-level system of government, like decentralization, 
does not necessarily mean shifting the systems, but rather as a response according to the divergent 
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needs of citizens in different locales (Lee et al., 2008). To reduce vertical and horizontal imbalances 
between the central and the subnational governments as well as other subnational governments, the 
central government also transfers intergovernmental grants to the subnational governments. In this 
study, the subnational government is represented by the local government, i.e. regency and city. 
In Indonesia, in 2019, the value of the transfer of funds to the local governments are totaled 
Rp832,3 trillion. The provision of substantial funds without the supervision of execution can lead to 
abuse. There are potential conflicts of interest that can lead to agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
fiscal decentralization, the agency problem occurs when local governments who receive the authority, 
act as agents, has information that is not known by central government who delegates fiscal authority, 
acts as a principal. Local governments have more information at their own budget rather than the 
central government. In this condition the local government, potentially, does not act for the central 
government interest or become self-interested. 
The differences in interests between the principal and the agent associated with central and 
local government relations are interesting and challenging to learn. This is the focus of this study. When 
the central budget to local governments becomes larger while its outcome is small, then the transfer 
of funds to local government will be compensated by the discretion in tax collection and using its 
budget to local authorities. However, the principal-agent interest conflict can make local governments 
depend on central government transfers. This is due to lack of balance funds transfer policies related 
to local government performance. As a result, moral hazard can occur. It causes a high dependence on 
central funding and the sub-optimal effort to increase local revenue. Low local government revenue 
would be an obstacle in the provision of public services. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia 
Researches on the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia have been carried out. One of them 
is Ferazi (2000), who explained that in the current reform period the concept of federalism during the 
colonial era resurfaced although not discussed openly, inclusively, and equally. Although the concept 
of federalism is less developed in the short term, there is potential for the structural growth in 
Indonesia. Brodjonegoro and Martinez-Marquez (2002) explains that the implementation of 
decentralization in Indonesia has experienced significant progress. While Smith (2008) argues that the 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia, there are still political uncertainty, in which the 
influence of the politicians is still prevalent. Fadliya and McLeod (2010) conducted an analysis of the 
fiscal equalization when some central authorities are delegated to the regions. According to them, a 
decentralized system was introduced too rushed and lack of clarity. So, the results are not as desired. 
According to Jaya (2010), the policy of decentralization and regional autonomy in Indonesia still has 
not fully met the expectations theory. Other researchers, Shah (2012) explains that over the last 
decade, Indonesia has transformed itself from a centralized to a decentralized system of government 
in which local governments are given the responsibility of spending while maintaining a centralized tax 
system. To finance the expenditure decentralization of local government, Indonesia implemented a 
new system of intergovernmental finance. 
The data indicate that the local revenues of taxes and levies sector are still relatively small. Even 
for counties and cities, it actually decreases compared to total revenues in the local government 
budget (APBD). Supposedly, with the grant of discretion in local revenues, the local government can 
more easily increase taxes and levies. However, granting of discretion shows a decrease of local 
revenues in taxes and levies. Local financial dependence on the central government is becoming 
increasingly high. The percentage of the regency and city revenues after fiscal decentralization has 
decreased compared to before the fiscal decentralization (Directorate General of Fiscal Balance, MOF, 
1997-2010). The data can be described in the table below. 
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Table 1. Regencies and Cities  Revenues After and Before Fiscal Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central government expenditure in the form of a transfer of funds to the regions is dominated 
by the quite high fund balance, that the state budget in 2019 is planned for Rp832,3 trillion, or nearly 
half the value of the Government Budget (Financial Memorandum, 2019). Therefore, the transfer of 
funds to the local government with granting of discretion on taxes and levies is expected to increase 
local tax effort and reduce the financial burden of the central government.  
 
Principal-Agent Model for Decentralization in Indonesia: Primal-Dual 
In microeconomics, the optimization problem can be represented in two different paths primal and 
dual. The selection of optimization problem depends on the information obtained in the process of 
achieving optimization solutions. Primal dual concept has become a standard optimization solution in 
the micro-economic literature. In the approach to the consumer, the primal concept aims to maximize 
the utility function of consumers with budget constraints (subject to budget constraint) in order to 
obtain an optimal solution of the primal problem. Such concepts will generate Marshallian demand 
solutions. In the dual concept, consumers will minimize the expenditure function with the constraints 
of his utility function (subject to utility function), so an optimal solution for the dual problem will be 
obtained. The optimal solution is obtained through a dual concept generating Hicksian demand 
solutions. 
Both the optimal solutions for the primal dual concept will yield the same value. It means finding 
the optimal solution through the concept of the primal or the dual concept of an optimal solution will 
result the same. This condition occurs only when there is symmetrical information on both primal and 
dual approaches. The objective function of the primal approach will be a constraint on the dual 
approach, and vice versa, the objective function in the dual approach will be a constraint on the primal 
approach. If it is not symmetric, the optimal solution will be different from the primal and dual 
approaches. 
The basic model used in this study is the principal-agent approach, modified model of economic 
information that is performed by Varian (1992), Furubotn and Richter (1998), and Snyder and 
Nicholson (2008) through the concept of primal-dual. In the appropriate parsimony principle in the 
formulation of economic phenomena into the equation, all local revenues are derived from the fund 
balance and the local revenue, denoted as T. Fund balance is divided into non-share transfer, a, and a 
system of revenue sharing (share transfer), b. The existence of local government efforts to increase 
revenue through local taxes, will produce outcomes as a result, of Q, where the outcome is going up 
or down in proportion to the effort of the agent, e. The central government wants a condition in which 
the transfer of the balance of funds will go down as the increase in local revenue by giving a wider 
discretion in taxes and levies. More explanation of the above can be formulated in the following 
equation: 
Total revenues (budget constraint) received by local agents (local government), T, is: 
 
         (1.1) 
 
 
 
Local Government Decentralization Total Revenue 
Local Tax 
Revenue
Percentage
Local Retribution 
Revenue
Percentage
1997
1998
Before
15,246,980.94
19,126,468.47
760,291.15
943,814.84
4.99
4.93
927,704.51
957,074.55
6.08
5.00
2006
2007
After
208,506,746,183
244,309,131,163
4,628,027,870
5,380,379,942
2.22
2.20
4,594,277,558
5,388,033,569
2.20
2.21
Regencies/Cities
Year
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When agents do the effort, it will cause costs (Varian (1992) and Snyder Nicholson (2008)) for: 
 
          (1.2) 
 
These costs arise because of the intensification of local revenues, such as the process of making 
regulations, education and training of human resources in the region, assisting policy-making, and 
other activities that support the increasing of local revenue. 
 
First order condition of equation (2.2) when the maximum effort:  
 
         (1.3) 
 
At the condition of maximum effort, the effort is equal to the marginal marginal outcome, 
where α is a constant, so that: 
 
eQ =              (1.4) 
  
Agent Utility 
Agent utility is total revenue minus the cost of the effort: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑇 − 𝑐          (1.5) 
 
or 
 
                   (1.6) 
 
Agent will maximize utility with the constraint Q=e, then the equation becomes: 
 
        (1.7) 
 
First order condition of agent utility for e is: 
 
         (1.8) 
 
or 
 
          (1.9) 
 
This is the incentive compatibility for the principal under uncertainty conditions, meaning that 
the local government under conditions of uncertainty should do the value of effort requirements 
desired by the central government. 
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Outcome Principal 
Principal outcome function, R, is: 
 
         (1.10) 
 
or 
 
        (1.11) 
 
Primal Solution 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥
𝑎,𝑏,𝑒
 𝑈 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑒 −
1
2
(𝛼𝑒2) 
 
Subject to: 
 
𝑄𝑝 ≤ (1 − 𝑏)𝑒 − 𝑎 
 
𝑒 ≤
𝑏
𝛼
 
 
Kuhn-Tucker model for this equation is: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑒 −
1
2
𝛼(𝑒)2 + 𝛾 (1 − 𝑏)𝑒 − 𝑎                        (1.12) 
 
Subtitution second constraint to equation (3.12) will be obtained: 
 
 𝑈 = 𝑎 +
1
2
(𝑏)2
𝛼
+  𝛾 (−𝑎 +
𝑏−(𝑏)2
𝛼
)  
  
Partial derivation for objective function becomes: 
 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑎
= 1 − 𝛾
    (1.13) 
 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑏
=
𝑏
𝛼
+
𝛾(1−2𝑏)
𝛼
  (1.14) 
 
 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝛾
= −𝑎 +
𝑏−(𝑏)2
𝛼
  (1.15) 
 
From above equation, can be known variable for  𝛾: 
 
 1 − 𝛾 = 0 
 
𝛾 = 1  (1.16) 
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Subtitution equation (2.16) to equation (2.14) can be obtained: 
 
𝑏
𝛼
+
𝛾(1 − 2𝑏)
𝛼
= 0 
 
𝑏
𝛼
+
1 − 2𝑏
𝛼
= 0 
 
 𝑏 = 1  (1.17) 
 
Because: 
 
𝑒 =
𝑏
𝛼
 
 
then: 
 
𝑒 =
1
𝛼
    (1.18) 
 
Dual Solution 
 
 𝑄𝑝  = (1 − 𝑏)𝑒 − 𝑎 
  
Subject to: 
   
 
  
   
𝑒 ≤
𝑏
𝛼
 
 
Equation in first constraints is participation constraint and in second constraints is incentive 
compatibility. Kuhn-Tucker model for this equation is: 
 
                𝐿(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑒, 𝜆) = (1 − 𝑏)𝑒 − 𝑎 + 𝜆 (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑒 − (
1
2
𝛼𝑒2))                     (1.19) 
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From partial derivation we can obtain: 
 
 
 
because λ=1, then: 
 
 
 
        (1.20) 
 
Value of effort, e=1/α, is the same in both solutions, primal and dual. In this condition, the 
central government, as principal, has the same information with the information held by the local 
government as an agent. The central government knows all the efforts made by the local government.  
Different things happen in conditions of asymmetric information. If the values of effort, e, is not same, 
the central government, as the principal, does not have the same information with the local 
authorities, acting as agents. The explanation proves that the primal-dual can be applied for the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia between the central government as a principal 
with the local government as an agent. These results need to be tested with data on the 
implementation of decentralization in Indonesia. Tests carried out using artificial neural networks 
analysis. 
 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
Artificial neural network (ANN) hereinafter called ANN inspired by biological tissues of the human 
brain, with the smallest processing units called neurons, which is estimated as many as 1,013 neurons. 
This simple model is further developed to a rather complicated model with multi-layer perceptron 
(MLP) or also known as a feed-forward neural network (FFNN) which is very flexible to model non-
linear regression, discriminant analysis, and data reduction models. 
 
ANN method is a new method in the science of economics, although in other areas already 
applied. ANN method is the application of the human nervous system. It is generalized into a 
mathematical model. The advantage in the use of neural networks as a research analysis is the 
existence of the layer in the process of incorporating the input to obtain the results. With the layer, 
the model is then able to perform a more precise estimate, so that the accuracy of the prediction is 
higher when compared with other models. In addition, the structure of the network architecture of 
ANN will create a model to be more flexible for the use in variety of requirements, both linear and non-
linear models. In simple terms, the comparison of ANN models with statistical models such as 
regression can be described in a simple figure below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Comparison of ANN Models with Statistical Models 
- Regression Model  
 
 
        Input          Output 
- ANN Model  
 
 
      Input             Layer               Output 
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Artificial Neural Network (ANN) for Social Research 
ANN has been widely used as an analytical tool in various studies. However, its use is still widely used 
in science than in the social science researches. In the social sciences, particularly economics, several 
studies indicate that the ANN models have a smaller error than the model analysis with statistical 
methods, such as Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Multiple Regression Analysis, Linear Probability Model 
(Chen (2005)). Hill et al. (1996) using neural networks for forecasting the data series is compared with 
the model of statistical forecasting as deseasonalized single exponential smoothing, Box-Jenkins, and 
deseasonalized Holt's exponential smoothing. It shows that the model of ANN is better than the 
traditional model in terms of MSE as a measure of goodness of fit. 
Bharat et al. (1997) suggested that ANN models consistently outperform on logistic regression 
models to predict the accuracy of any corporate bankruptcies of new business strategies. Meanwhile, 
Binner et al. (2004) predicted the occurrence of inflation and compared models of Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for the same data, in which the results 
showed that the RNN model error value is smaller than the VAR model. Mirmirani and Li (2004) also 
predict the movement of oil prices in the US by using the VAR model and Back Propagation NN for 
comparison, which shows that the NN models have a smaller error value than the VAR model. 
 
METHODS 
Analysis of the Decentralization in Indonesia Using Neural Networks 
The estimation method used in the study is ANN. The use of this method is based on several previous 
studies that showed that the value of the error in the estimation of ANN is smaller than the statistical 
model with econometric analysis. However, almost all studies in the social sciences, conducted for the 
data series, use ANN, while the use of panel data using principal-agent models like in this research is 
rare or even perhaps not used. 
The method chosen in this study is the ANN, using the architecture of multi-layer perceptron 
(MLP) or known by other terms of feed-forward neural network (FFNN). The reason for choosing this 
method is because the statistical models, FFNN, is very flexible for different types of data and analytical 
models, such as regression, nonlinear regression, discriminant analysis, and data reduction models 
(Subanar, 2005). Analysis was conducted using back propagation and training with Lavenberg-
Marquardt method. Initial data input is transformed into a normal distribution, corresponding binary 
sigmoid function as the activation requirement back propagation method (mapminmax). Network 
architecture in this study contains one hidden layer and one output layer with a selection of the most 
efficient number of neurons that can be seen in the mean square error (MSE) and the sum square error 
(SSE). The interpretation of the results, for primal and dual solutions of decentralization in Indonesia, 
we use the Garson algorithm (Olden and Jackson, 2002).  
 
Estimation Model 
Estimation is carried out in two stages. The first stage is to look for a local tax effort and the second 
step is to find out whether there is asymmetric information between the central government and the 
local government using a tax effort proxy. FFNN model in the local tax effort estimation can be 
formulated in the form of a mathematical equation as follows: 
 
?̂? =  𝑓•
ᵒ [𝑤•
ᵒ𝑓ℎ {𝑤𝑦𝑝
ℎ . 𝑥𝑦𝑝 + 𝑏𝑦𝑝
ℎ } + 𝑏•
ᵒ]      (1.21) 
 
Where, 
yˆ  = response value or target i.e.  Local tax-revenue ratio  
of
•  = activation function of neuron at output layer 
ow
•  = weight from neuron at hidden layer to neuron at output layer 
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yp
x  = input variable, local revenue per capita 
h
ypw = weight from input to neuron at hidden layer 
h
yp
b  = bias from neuron at hidden layer 
hf  = activation function to neuron at hidden layer 
ob
•  = bias of neuron at output layer 
 
Operational definitions of variables in the first section of the analysis are as follows: 
?̂? = estimation of the ratio of the output with local revenue. Local revenue comes from local 
tax sector and admission levy. The output is gross regional domestic product (GRDP). 
xyp =  income per capita i.e. gross regional domestic product (GRDP) per capita. 
 
The second stage of the model is to estimate tax effort with variables of input revenue and 
expenditure fund: 
 
?̂? =  𝑓•
ᵒ[𝑤•
ᵒ𝑓ℎ{(𝑤𝑡
ℎ. 𝑘𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡
ℎ) + (𝑤𝑠
ℎ. 𝑙𝑡 + 𝑏𝑠
ℎ)} + 𝑏•
ᵒ]      (1.22) 
 
Where, 
eˆ  = response value or target, i.e. local tax effort 
of
•  = activation function of neuron at output layer 
ow
•  = weight of neuron at hidden layer to neuron at output layer 
t
k  = input variable, local revenue 
t
l  = input variable, local expenditure 
h
ypw = weight from input to neuron at hidden layer 
h
yp
b  = bias of neuron at hidden layer 
hf  = activation function of neuron at hidden layer 
ob
•  = bias of neuron at output layer 
 
Operational definitions of variables in the third section of the analysis are as follows: 
 
?̂? = the tax effort is the result of estimated tax collection as a proxy of the potential taxes, 
which are then compared with the actual. 
t
k  = local revenue from equalization funds transfer and local revenue. 
t
l
 
=  local expenditure from equalization funds transfer and local revenue. 
 
The purpose of estimation of the first stage is to get the local government tax effort in Indonesia. 
Tax effort resulted from compares the estimation of local tax income and actual tax revenue. Finally, 
the purpose of estimating the second stage to determine whether there is asymmetric information in 
the implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. 
 
Research Data 
The data used in this study include data regencies and cities across Indonesia, which are obtained from 
the Directorate General of Financial Equalization, Ministry of Finance and the Central Bureau of 
Statistics. The data contain local tax and levies, Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP), GRDP per 
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capita, General Allocation Funds (DAU), Special Allocation Fund (DAK), tax-share (DBH Pajak), and 
natural resources-share (DBH SDA), during 2005-2015 periods to 224 regencies and cities in Indonesia. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Estimation was conducted through the feed forward neural network with a back-propagation method. 
The training used Lavenberg-Marquard models. Analyses were performed with several hidden layer 
and output layer. Prior to analysis, the input data was a panel data with 224 cross-section data, eleven 
series and two variables were converted into a matrix form whose results were of the order matrix 
(224 x 11 x 2) with a total of 4928 observations. Data input were local government revenue and 
expenditure, and the target was local tax effort. These data then transformed into a normal 
distribution with binary sigmoid function. After the establishment of the appropriate matrix, the next 
step was to divide the data into three parts, i.e. 70 percent for training, 15 percent for validation, and 
15 percent for testing. The benefit of fit analysis in this section is the minimum errors of mean square 
error (MSE) and sum square error (SSE). The results of the analysis showed that using the back-
propagation method would reach minimum of mean square error (MSE) and the sum square error 
(SSE) when using certain amount neurons in the hidden layer.   
The results of the analysis in the first section (equation 1.21) showed that using the back-
propagation method would reach minimum of mean square error (MSE) and the sum square error 
(SSE) when using four neurons in the hidden layer. MSE and SSE with four neurons in the hidden layer 
was 0.00816701 and 20.12352291. The result shows that the parameter of input variable i.e local 
revenue per capita, m = 0.5250 and intercept/constant = 0.0880. The result of estimation can be made 
comparison tax effort and GRDP as seen in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Tax Effort Proportion - GRDP per Capita Comparison in 224 Regencies and Cities in Indonesia 
High Medium Low Total
High 4,46% 3.57% 9.82% 17.86%
Medium 1.79% 3.57% 9.82% 15.18%
Low 4.91% 11.16% 50.89% 66.96%
Total 11.16% 18.30% 70.54% 100.00%
GRDP per Capita
Tax Effort
 
 
The table shows  that most of the local government regencies and the cities have low tax efforts 
as much as 66.96 percent. Only 17.86 percent has a high tax effort. Table 1 also show that regions with 
high per capita GRDP (11.16 percent), 4.46 percent showed high tax efforts, while the rest, 6.7 percent, 
has moderate efforts to lower taxes. Disturbingly, in regions having low per capita GRDP, most of 
which, 50.89 percent, have low tax efforts. Indirectly, the table indicates that most of the region has 
low tax efforts. 
The second estimation as show in equation 1.22 results MSE = 0.02393862, SSE = 33.27468647, 
parameter of input variable i.e local revenue and expenditure, m = 0.9181, intercept,b = 0.0073, and 
coefficient r = 0.71. For interpretation of the results, I use the Garson algorithm (Olden and Jackson, 
2002). Garson calculation algorithm for result of equation 1.22 showed the following results: 
 
Table 2. Relative Contribution and Relative Importance Input Variables to Local Tax Effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Local Revenue 1.474 0.491
Local Expenditure 1.526 0.509
Relative 
Contribution
Relative    
Importance 
Input Variables
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As shown in Table 2 above, the value of the relative importance between revenue and 
expenditure shows different results. The relative importance value of local revenue of the tax effort is 
49 percent, while for regional expenditure is 51 percent. The difference between the relative 
importance of the two input variables to the efforts of tax is 1.80 percent. Based on the derivation of 
the equations associated with the tax effort, these differences indicate the occurrence of asymmetric 
information between the central government as a principal with the local government as agents in the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization in Indonesia. There are agents who do not act in accordance 
with the interest of the principal. 
Derivation of the equation shows that when there is symmetric information between central 
and local governments, according to the concept of primal-dual, the value of the agent effort will be 
the same when seen from the revenue and expenditure side of the budget. However, the data in this 
essay show the different values. It means there is asymmetric information between principals and 
agents. Giving discretion on local revenues and expenditures should be a stimulus for the regional 
economy, it does not necessarily make the region increase its tax effort as the expectations of the 
central government and fiscal dependence on the national budget have been decreased. Although 
there has been no standard that measures the magnitude of the degree of information asymmetry, 
but the difference is not significant enough. Therefore, it can be said that through proxy tax effort, the 
level of asymmetric information between central and local governments is not too high. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In fiscal decentralization, it may occur conflicts of interest between the central government, as the 
giver of authority which acts as a principal, with the local government as an agent who received the 
delegation of authority. The interest of the central government, when delegating authority is to ensure 
that all programs will run on all local governments. On the other hand, local governments, as an agent, 
also have an interest in maximizing their own utility. This condition will lead to a situation of 
uncertainty.  
Results from the estimation conclude that there is asymmetric information between central 
government and local governments. The data indicating that the relative value of the relative 
contribution or importance shows different values. This condition explains that in terms of tax effort, 
asymmetric information between the principal or the agent of the central government to local 
governments in Indonesia occurs. The central government, as the principal, does not know the efforts 
of local governments to raise taxes on the result, whether it is due to the hard work of the local 
government or other reasons such as tax regulations, obedience the tax payer, or the performance of 
tax officials. By knowing the local tax effort, it will be easier for the central government to formulate a 
transfer fund as fair incentives for local government. Inserting local tax effort variables into this 
formulation will differentiate region that has worked hard to raise taxes and region where its taxes 
increase due to mere chance. Within the framework of the financial relationship between central and 
local governments, local tax effort can be improved by reformulating the mechanism of balancing 
funds.  
 The effort of local governments can be used as an outcome indicator in the formulation of 
government funds balance transfers. Incorporating this indicator into the formulation of equalization 
funds, means taking into account the interests of central government for the use of these funds by 
local governments. The higher the effort to increase revenue, the higher the outcome of the central 
government.  
Achievements of higher central government outcomes are marked with the reduction in the 
fiscal dependence of local governments to the central government and improvements in the public 
services provided by local government. This is consistent with the mandate of Article 18 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, in which the unitary Republic of Indonesia is divided 
into the provinces, and the province is divided into regencies and cities with the most authority 
delivered to local government, but the final responsibility of the authority remains on the central 
government. 
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